The legal status of international human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has been the subject of much debate, culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) 
THE TRUE MOTIVATION FOR FEDERAL INCORPORATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION

This Article argues that the focus on doctrine masks underlying international relations theory assumptions that are the true motivations of the federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation under the ATS. One cannot evaluate the desirability of the federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation in U.S. courts without having a theory of the operation of the international system, the motivation for state behavior in international politics, and the efficacy of international law as a coercive instrument. Proponents of the federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation implicitly rely on social constructivism, democratic peace theory, and institutionalism-international relations theories that motivate a universalist theory of international law.
The universalist theory holds that international law has an independent, exogenous affect on state behavior Since States obey international law out of legal obligation, universalists tend to encourage the greater integration of CIL into domestic legal regimes and the use of CIL to improve human rights practices around the world. Therefore, the desirability and efficacy of the federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation under the ATS depends on the explanatory power of specific international relations theories and the strength of the universalist theory as the appropriate conception of international law.
This Article directly engages the universalist theory of international law and the underlying international relations assumptions upon which proponents of federal incorporation and international human rights litigation under the ATS rely. The Article examines a competing international relations theory and alternative conception of international law that views compliance as a function of state interests rather than of legal obligation. Working from this perspective, the Article provides a framework to evaluate the desirability of the federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation in U.S. courts. The Article concludes that international human rights litigation under the current legal regime would likely complicate the achievement of the United States' normative and strategic foreign policy goals. Given the executive's institutional competencies, constitutional prerogatives and resource advantages, it is the branch best-placed to determine whether international human rights litigation will assist or hinder the United States'foreign policy objectives. Therefore, the Article suggests that a modest shift along the continuum of existing judicial deference to the executive branch-perhaps in the form of judicial review of executive determinations on specific litigation under an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion or reasonableness standard-is warranted for international human
INTRODUCTION
The logic of federal incorporation of customary international law (CIL) and international human rights litigation in United States courts under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) implicitly relies on a universalist theory of international law. According to this view, international law has an exogenous effect on state behavior. States do not comply with international law out of pure self-interest; rather, States comply with international law out of legal or moral obligation. Based on this assumption, universalists naturally promote the development of a global judicial system, the greater integration of international law into domestic legal Fall 20071 regimes, and the use of international law to improve human rights practices around the world. The federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation in U.S. courts are extensions of the universalist project.
This Article challenges the universalist theory of international law upon which federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation rely. It unpacks the international relations (IR) theory paradigms that support the universalist theory, and discusses a competing theory that views state compliance with international law as a function of national self-interest. Working from this perspective, it proposes a framework to evaluate the wisdom of federal incorporation of CIL and the wisdom of international human rights litigation. The framework suggests that federal incorporation of CIL generates sovereignty costs for the United States, and that international human rights litigation complicates the achievement of the United States' normative and strategic foreign policy interests. The Article also shows that the universalist theory of international law is often in tension with actual state behavior in international politics.
The universalist theory draws from IR theories that focus on the role of regime type, institutions, and social norms in understanding international politics. Democratic peace theory, institutionalism, and social constructivism each implicitly assume that international law has the capacity to affect state behavior. According to these IR theories, international law can encourage respect for legal norms, limit the return to material power in international politics, and operate as an instrument of progressive change. The wisdom of federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation depends on the explanatory power of IR theories and the strength of the universalist theory as the appropriate conception of international law.
Despite the clear attraction of these normative goals, the universalist theory relies on IR theories that often fail to recognize some of the constraints under which the United States operates in international politics. For example, although democratic peace theory and social constructivism may explain some state behavior in international politics, the United States also pursues its foreign policy goals in an international system constituted by States sensitive to the distribution of material power, concerned with issues of national security, suspicious of international law, and often motivated by national self-interest. In other words, realism also explains some state behavior in international politics. This reality naturally produces a tension between the assumptions motivating the universalist theory and the actual behavior of States. By viewing federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation in U.S.
[Vol. 29:1 courts solely through a universalist lens, one misses their potential costs for the United States.
Examining federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation from a non-universalist perspective contributes to the discussion about the proper role of international law in the American legal system. The United States' relationship with international law is largely based on national self-interest, evolving with the United States' relative position and strategic goals in international politics. Working from a non-universalist perspective, this Article connects a plausible IR theory of state behavior in international politics with a theory of state compliance with international law to evaluate the consequences of federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation under the ATS. ' Perhaps most important, this approach engages the first principles that motivate arguments in support of federal incorporation of CIL and continued international human rights litigation in U.S. courts. One's view of the appropriate treatment of CIL within the American legal system is linked to IR assumptions about the operation of the international system, the role of international law in international politics, and the efficacy of international law as a coercive instrument. From a universalist perspective, these assumptions militate in favor of the greater integration of CIL, continued international human rights litigation under the ATS, and a preference for the judiciary over the executive in determining the optimal relationship between international law and the American legal system. These assumptions, however, are often unchallenged in international law scholarship. This Article directly engages the implicit IR assumptions that underlie the doctrinal debate.
Finally, this argument does not constitute a rejection of the broader universalist project to fight human rights violations around the world. The improvement of the human condition is of the highest importance. Understanding the operation of the international system and the nature of state compliance with international law will only help in creating the proper institutional arrangements to increase respect for international law in the world community. However, Bradley does not directly engage the underlying assumptions about state behavior and international law that provide the theoretical foundation for federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation under the ATS. Phillip Trimble focuses on the rise of international institutions and increasing globalization to evaluate effects on American democracy. See Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International Institutions, and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MIcH. L. REV. 1944 REV. (1997 . The argument proceeds in five parts. Part I very briefly outlines the doctrinal discussion regarding the federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation in U.S. courts. Part II explores the IR theories that motivate the universalist theory, and connects them to arguments supporting federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation under the ATS. Part I develops the argument by (1) providing a competing theory of state compliance with international law based on national self-interest, and (2) presenting a framework to evaluate the potential consequences of federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation. Part IV discusses the possibility of international human rights litigation producing a nationalist backlash in targeted States. Part V addresses counter-arguments. I conclude with a brief discussion of my argument's implications for the allocation of decisionmaking authority among the branches of government.
I. STATE OF THE DOCTRINE: FEDERAL INCORPORATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
The appropriate treatment of CIL in the American legal system and the legitimacy of international human rights litigation through the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) have produced a voluminous literature 2 By way of background, the ATS states that: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 3 CIL is the contemporary equivalent of the law of nations and includes international human rights law. If CIL possesses domestic legal status as federal common law through the ATS, an alien would have a cognizable claim in a U.S. court for a tort committed in violation of international human rights law.
2.
For an overview of the debate before the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Debate on the propriety of federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation can be divided into two camps: adherents to the modern position and revisionist scholars. Though this bifurcation does not capture alternative positions that purport to find a middle S 4 ground between the two perspectives, it helps frame the dominant themes in the debate.
A. The Modern Position
Proponents of the modem position argue that CIL has domestic legal status as self-executing federal common law and provides a basis for international human rights litigation in U.S. courts. "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending on it are duly presented for their determination." 5 Drawing from this statement in the Supreme Court's decision in The Paquete Habana, CIL is properly incorporated as U.S. law and interpreted by the judiciary.
As "part of our law," all CIL has domestic status as federal common law. The shift from the Swifr 6 to Erie 7 regimes-requiring federal common law to have a basis in the Constitution or Congressional actiondoes not apply to CIL. Application of Erie to CIL would create the possibility of multiple inconsistent interpretations of CIL by the states. 8 "Any question of applying [CIL] in our courts involves the foreign relations of the United States and can thus be brought within a federal power ... [and] would be as unsound as it would be unwise to make our state courts our ultimate authority for pronouncing the rules of international law." 9 Therefore, CIL has domestic legal status as federal common law without federal political branch authorization.
Proponents of federal incorporation of CIL read the Supreme Court's examination of CIL in Sabbatino'° as further evidence of CIL's status of federal common law. In Sabbatino, "the Court construed customary international law to determine that international law neither compelled nor required application of the act of state doctrine,"" thus explicitly treating Koh, supra note 2, at 1833 (emphasis added).
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CIL as federal common law for purposes of constitutional interpretation. The federal incorporation of CIL is consistent with the federal prerogative in foreign affairs and maintains the supremacy and uniformity of federal common law.' 2 For proponents of the modem position, the historical evolution of the "law of nations" doctrine;" the Supreme Court's international law jurisprudence in the Paquete Habana and Sabbatino;
and the Second Circuit's holding in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala1 4 demonstrate that CIL has been appropriately treated as self-executing federal common law.
B. The Revisionists
Revisionist scholars counter that CIL does not have federal common law status without ex ante federal political branch approval. 5 They assert that the modem position reflects "a combination of troubling developments, including mistaken interpretations of history, doctrinal bootstrapping by the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law and academic fiat."' 6 The law of nations was historically treated as non-federal or "general law" that U.S. courts applied "in the absence of any particular domestic authorization unless and until state or federal legislation specified otherwise."" However, after Erie, new federal common law must derive from either the U.S. Constitution or Congressional action through a federal statute. 8 Since incorporation of CIL as federal common law has not been authorized by either method, both "the modem position's envisioned application of CIL by the federal judiciary"' 9 and international human rights litigation, which relies "on the existence of an independently-derived federal common law of international human rights law," 20 are unconstitutional.
The revisionists also worry about the broader implications of the modem position. If CIL has domestic legal status as federal common law, it could presumably "preempt[ ] inconsistent state law pursuant to the Supremacy Clause ... bind the President under the "Take Care" Clause of Article II of the Constitution ... [and] supersede[] inconsistent federal legislation." 2 ' They conclude that the modem position conflicts with the Supreme Court's federalism jurisprudence, 2 2 traditions of American representative democracy, and the foreign affairs prerogatives of the legislative and executive branches of government.
C. The Effect of Sosa on the Incorporation Debate
The Supreme Court entered the federal incorporation debate in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain. 23 In 1985, a Mexican drug cartel organized the kidnapping, torture and murder of an agent of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency. The DEA believed Dr. Alvarez-Machain provided the agent with medical treatment to prolong the torture. 2 ' A U.S grand jury indicted Alvarez-Machain, but the Mexican government refused to transfer him to U.S. custody. The DEA then hired defendant Jose Francisco Sosa-a bounty hunter-to capture Alvarez-Machain and deliver him to U.S. officials. Sosa abducted Alvarez-Machain and he was eventually brought to trial. 2 " After a federal district court granted Alvarez-Machain's motion for acquittal, he successfully filed suit under the ATS alleging that his abduction constituted an arbitrary arrest and a violation of CIL. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Alvarez-Machain's arbitrary arrest constituted a violation of CIL and was grounds for a cause of action under the ATS. 26 The Supreme Court addressed the ATS's meaning and scope and concluded that the ATS permitted U.S. courts to hear federal common law claims based on a small number of CIL violations under specified conditions.
Although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action, the reasonable inference from the historical 20.
Id materials is that the statute was intended to have practical effect the moment it became law. The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time. 7 The Court concluded that the substantive evolution of CIL could lead to new causes of action under the ATS as long as they were sufficiently specific, universal, and obligatory CIL norms." Alvarez-Machain's arbitrary arrest claim-a detention of one day-did not constitute a specific, universal, and obligatory CIL norm cognizable under the ATS. Proponents of the modern position read Sosa's authorization of federal common law claims based on CIL as confirmation that all CIL possesses domestic legal status as federal common law; that the ATS itself both creates federal causes of action for CIL violations and permits federal courts to develop new causes of action from evolving CIL norms; and that federal courts can consider myriad sources of law to determine the existence of specific, universal, and obligatory CIL norms." For many scholars, Sosa stands for the triumph of the modern position over the revisionist critique. 0 Though this doctrinal debate is important, it ignores more powerful underlying IR assumptions about the operation of the international system, the efficacy of international law, and the possibility of an international judicial system, that both produce the universalist theory and motivate advocates of federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation under the ATS. However, these IR assumptions and the universalist theory remain unexplored. The following section engages the IR assumptions and the universalist theory 27 .
Id. at 724. 28.
Id. at 732.
29.
For a critical summary of the modem position on Sosa, [Vol. 29:1 that encourage the creation of an international system based on the rule of law and the use of international law as an instrument of progressive change.
II. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND THE UNIVERSALIST CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Over the past 20 years, the disciplines of IR and international law have grown closer.' IR is the study of foreign affairs, specifically focusing on the behavior of States in international politics, the role of international institutions, and the broader operation of the international system. Social constructivism, democratic peace theory, and institutionalism are IR paradigms common in international law scholarship" They underlie the constitutive, identity, and rational choice theories of state compliance with international law, respectively, and provide the foundational assumptions that promote the universalist theory. 33 
A. Social Constructivism S• 34.
Social constructivism is an approach to IR with two central assumptions: (1) shared ideas form the structure of human organization and (2) the content of those shared ideas constructs the interests and
31.
See A full analysis of the IR paradigms-each possessing a breadth, richness, and variety that warrants extensive discussion-are well beyond the scope of this Article. Similarly, a comprehensive evaluation of the several theories of state compliance with international law is a bridge too far. My goal is to provide a sketch of the underlying logic of the IR paradigms to demonstrate their prominence in international law scholarship and influence on the federal incorporation and international human rights litigation debates. I necessarily focus on a limited number of scholars that reflect the contemporary discourse in both IR and international law scholarship. Although this may simplify the discussion, it permits an analysis of the IR paradigms and their assumptions about international law.
33. This Article neither formally critiques the internal coherence of the various IR theories nor tests empirically the capacity of these IR theories to explain state behavior in international politics. Rather, the Article demonstrates how some IR theories are framed to produce the universalist theory. is the mechanism through which international norms are diffused in the world community. The judiciary is the government organ through which the norms are embedded into state practice.
B. Democratic Peace Theory
Democratic peace theory 38 posits that the absence of war between democracies results from two factors unique to democratic governance. First, democracies possess institutional attributes3-responsiveness to public opinion, separation of powers, and a system of checks and balances-that constrain decisionmakers and encourage foreign policy transparency. Second, the norms, values, and culture produced through democratic governance generate a "democratic" commitment to the peaceful resolution of political conflicts. Among democracies, regime type and individual preferences motivate state behavior in international politics.
35.
See 
C. Institutionalism
Institutionalist 4 ' or regime 4 2 theory argues that institutions can facilitate rational, self-interested cooperation among States with common political and economic interests. Institutions reduce the two main obstacles to cooperation-information asymmetries and uncertainty-through increased information and transparency, lower transaction costs, and behavior standards to evaluate reputation. 43 By facilitating cooperation among rational actors, institutionalism produces rational choice theories of state compliance with institutional rules and international law. States are pushed to comply because they fear reciprocal noncompliance, high reputation costs to defecting from accepted legal norms, and the prospect of retaliation by other States." Therefore, States can pursue their rational self-interests and international law can exert an exogenous effect on state behavior.
The rise of social constructivism, institutionalism, and democratic peace theory within IR generally coincides with political and structural changes in the international system. For many, the collapse of the Soviet Union; the rise of democratic governments in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia; and the emergence of U.S. unipolar dominance of international politics suggest that the Kantian world of liberal States is 40 .
See increasingly possible. 4 5 These changes provide an opportunity for the United States to change fundamentally the nature of international politics and to use its influence to promote democracy, universal human rights, and multilateralism, resulting in an international system based on the rule of law.
D. The Universalist Theory of International Law
Embedded in this broader international political context and influenced by specific IR theories, modern scholars have developed a general universalist theory of state compliance with international law. The universalist theory relies on the IR assumptions of social constructivism, institutionalism, and democratic peace theory. These IR theories share two attributes. First, the theories reject the role of power and self-interest as causal variables to explain state behavior and, in the case of institutionalism, suggest that institutions can minimize the pernicious effects of the pursuit of national self-interests and encourage cooperation. Second, each theory produces similar conclusions about the capacity of international law to affect state behavior. Constitutive, rational choice, and identity theories of state compliance lead to the proposition that international law has an independent, exogenous effect on state behavior.4 6 Through the development of an international judicial system, 1 international law can create a constitutional order in international politics and operate as an instrument of progressive change. State compliance with international law invites greater coordination among judicial bodies, harmonization of international legal rules, and integration of international law into the American legal system-the federal incorporation of CIL. Table 1 illustrates the connection between IR theories about the operation of international politics and the universalist theory of international law:
45.
See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992 Given state compliance with international law, scholars envisage it as an instrument to regulate domestic affairs. Traditionally, international law has regulated state-to-state relations to maintain international order. The Concert of Nations, the League of Nations, and the United Nations were all conceived as institutions to regulate the political and security affairs of their respective Member States. In the mid-twentieth century, States began to use international law more aggressively to regulate Stateto-citizen relations through international human rights law. 48 For many scholars, international human rights litigation vindicates the rights of individuals, exposes egregious human rights practices, and punishes violators of international human rights law. It contributes to the socialization of States and acculturation of individuals, leading to the adoption of shared values throughout the international community. 4 9 The universalist theory produces a normative project to judicialize international politics, integrate international law into domestic legal systems, and promote progressive change. The federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation are necessary for the realization of these goals. 
III. A NEW FRAMEWORK TO EVALUATE FEDERAL INCORPORATION
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
Suppose that the operation of the international system does not always reflect the assumptions of social constructivism, democratic peace theory, and institutionalism. Suppose further that the United States' compliance with international law does not always reflect legal or moral obligation. If these suppositions are accurate, evaluating the federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation solely through the lens of a universalist theory of international law will produce an inaccurate understanding of their consequences for the United States.
This section develops my framework for evaluating federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation by examining the role of power and self-interest in international politics. If these factors play a role in motivating state behavior in international politics, they might contribute to our understanding of state behavior in international politics and state compliance with international law.
A. Realism
Realism focuses on the balance of power among States and the pursuit of economic and military strength to ensure security in international politics. Although there are variants of realist thought, realism relies on three core assumptions. 0 First, realism assumes that States operate in an international system without a central enforcement mechanism to regulate state behavior-an international system in which there is no global policeman to restrain powerful States from coercing weaker States. Second, security is the primary state goal. Since States desire "to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order,"'" they focus on developing military strength and economic resources relative to other States. 5 2 Third, realism assumes that States are 51.
MEARSHEIMER, supra note 50, at 31.
52.
See id. at 55; WALTZ, supra note 50, at 131.
[Vol. 29:1 rational actors. Norms, institutions, and regime type have little effect on state behavior. Given these assumptions, realists do not develop a theory of state compliance with international law. For them, the content of international law reflects the underlying distribution of power in international politics and represents the interests of the powerful States. "Most international law is obeyed most of the time, but strong States bend or break law when they choose to." 53
B. International Law and State Interests
In an international system focused on power, state compliance with CIL is a "function of national self-interest." 5 4 "International law emerges from States' pursuit of self-interested policies on the international stage.
[It] is ... endogenous to state interests. It is not a check on state selfinterest; it is a product of state self-interest." 55 State behavior consistent with CIL reflects four "behavioral logics": cooperation, coordination, coincidence of interest, and coercion. Cooperation derives from bilateral repeat prisoner's dilemma interactions based on four conditions: (1) States have low discount rates; (2) indefinite duration of interactions; (3) the payoff from defection must not dramatically exceed the payoff from cooperation; and (4) cooperative moves are clearly defined 6 For coordination, "each State's best move depends on the move of the other State. 57 However, in repeat prisoner's dilemma interactions, the necessary conditions for cooperation and coordination are hard to maintain. As additional States participate, the cost of monitoring and the possibilities of erroneous punishment and potential free-riding increase. Cooperation and coordination are unlikely to produce state action consistent with CIL.
State "compliance" with CIL is actually a product of coercion or coincidence of interest. Coincidence of interest represents behavior in which each State "obtains private advantages from a particular action... irrespective of the action of the other." 59 
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 54, at 1122. A more prominent role for power and national self-interest in international politics leads to two conclusions about the efficacy of international law as a coercive instrument. First, since compliance with international law reflects coercion or coincidence of interest, it is unlikely that international law independently affects state behavior. Second, since international law has little independent effect on state behavior, an international judicial system to regulate international political affairs will be ineffective, by itself, to constrain States. These two conclusions challenge the universalist theory. 
C. The Wisdom of Federal Incorporation and International Human Rights Litigation
Arguments in support of federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation reflect the universalist theory and the assumptions of social constructivism, democratic peace theory, and institutionalism. In contrast, this section provides a framework for evaluating federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation that takes into account factors that the universalist theory fails to consider: the value of sovereignty; the distribution of power in the international system; the methodology and content of international law; the structural trends in international politics; and complementarity with the normative and strategic goals of American foreign policy. This framework produces a set of conclusions about the proper relationship between international law and the American legal system and the consequences of federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation.
Sovereignty
The framework starts with the assumption that States value sovereignty: the autonomy of the political order premised on "the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures" 6 ' within its recognized territory. This Westphalian conception of sovereignty coexists with international legal sovereignty, "the practices associated with mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical independence. ' '6 Clearly, the concept of sovereignty is malleable, as history is replete with instances of powerful States violating the sovereignty of weaker States-colonialism, for example-and imposing external political orders. I do not claim that States have always respected Westphalian or international legal sovereignty. I do not deny that States often cede aspects of their sovereignty for instrumental reasons. My claim is much more limited and uncontroversial: States value their capacity to exclude external actors from their recognized territory, maintain an autonomous domestic political order, and pursue their interests unencumbered by external political constraints. Working from this assumption, it is unlikely that self-interested States sensitive to the distribution of power in the international system would cede sovereignty over a particular aspect of their domestic political order for noninstrumental reasons. States operate in an international system with national security as their primary objective. 63 Although States may have a number of interests-the promotion of rule of law, universal human rights or democracy-States tend to prioritize security concerns. To achieve some level of security, States pursue material power: military strength and economic development.6 This does not mean that the pursuit of a State's normative interests could not, at times, help achieve security or strategic goals. It simply means that States are sensitive to shifts in their relative 65 power positions.
A State's material power influences its relationship with international law. The international system lacks a central enforcement mechanism to enforce international law. In this environment, States can comply with international law when it is in their interests to do so. But what does that tell us about the enforcement of international law? Few States have the material power act as a global policeman, enforcing international law and coercing state compliance. Those States that do-the great powers-are rational, self-interested actors that also enforce international law according to their self-interests.
Similarly, great powers are the only States that have the capacity to comply selectively or resist international law. In both instances, the State's relative power is the key variable; it allows a powerful State both to enforce international law on weak States and to resist the imposition of international law by others. 66 For a weak State, the sovereignty cost 67 of incorporation is low. If the great powers choose to impose their conception of international law, weak States lack the material capacity to resist. The forced integration of international law into its domestic legal structure is more likely.
As a State's power increases, the sovereignty costs of incorporation increase proportionally. At the same time, powerful States have the capacity to enforce and comply selectively with international law. [Vol. 29:1 greater capacity to resist international law that is contrary to their interests. Since States generally value sovereignty, it makes little sense for a powerful State to impose on itself-or to incorporate-a body of law that potentially contravenes that State's normative or strategic interests when there is no external actor capable of doing so. Unless international law consistently reflects the content of a powerful State's domestic law,
6
that State incurs a high sovereignty cost to incorporation.
This cost is increased for the United States. The United States' political, economic, 69 and military 0 dominance of international politics; the unipolar structure of the international system; 7 and the United States' capacity to comply with and enforce international law consistent with its interests suggests that the sovereignty cost of incorporating international law will be higher than the cost to any other State in the international system. On these grounds alone, the United States should be most circumspect about incorporating international law. In many ways, the United States has a greater capacity to act unilaterally and deviate from norms of international law that are in opposition to U.S. interests 72 To this point, I have discussed the role of power in terms of enforcement and compliance with international law. The role of power also plays a significant role in the creation of international law. If a powerful State can shape the content of international law ex ante, it is much more likely to reflect that particular State's interests, lowering the sovereignty cost of incorporation. This places considerable importance on the methodology underlying the creation of international law.
68.
It is unlikely that international law will always represent the interests of a specific State over a long period of time. The dynamic nature of international politics, the shifts in the distribution of power in the international system, and political and military conflict all suggest that powerful States will rise and fall, with new powers emerging. Therefore, the content of international law will necessarily evolve to reflect the emergence of new powers and possibly conflict with the interests of any one state.
69. "For the past century, the U.S. share of gross world product was often These critiques demonstrate CIL's methodological inconsistencies and manipulable content. Given the doctrinal subjectivity inherent in the CIL's methodology, it generally represents the state practice, customs, and strategic interests of the only actors in the international system capable of developing and enforcing CIL: the great powers. As I discussed earlier, since the United States and other great powers are the only States that possess the material power to enforce CIL, they have clear incentives to engage in self-interested enforcement. They can coerce compliance with CIL from weak States and, since there is no central enforcement mechanism, engage in low cost violations of CIL.
If the powerful States determine the content of CIL and they are the only States capable of enforcing it, they should not-fear federal incorporation of CIL. Presumably, CIL will generally reflect their interests and complement their domestic laws. To evaluate this claim, I discuss the shift in methodology and content of CIL.
b. The New CIL The modern, or "new," CIL 78 challenges the "traditional" CIL paradigm in methodology, reach, and content. 9 emergence of a new body of law; rather the new CIL refers to the evolution in CIL's content and its new focus on human rights. In contrast to traditional CIL-a slowly developing body of law governing state-tostate relations-the new CIL develops rapidly'° and regulates the relationship between the State and its citizens. The new CIL is a vehicle for the promotion of human rights and the basis of international human rights litigation under the ATS.
While the new CIL is more invasive in reach and content, it lacks a coherent methodology 8 ' to explain the emergence of new human rights norms. It moves away from the traditional methodological foundations of custom and widespread, consistent state practice as sources of CIL norms. The new CIL "has been established largely by treaty-the U.N. Charter and international human rights covenants and conventions-but without any foundation or context of custom. 
83.
See Louis B. Sohn, "Generally Accepted" International Rules, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1073 (1986).
84. See Henkin, supra note 82, at 40. 85.
As Louis Sohn suggests, "This is the way international law is made, not by states, but by 'silly' professors writing books, and by knowing where there is a good book on the subject." Sohn, supra note 80, at 401.
86.
Proponents look to the terms of unsigned, non-ratified, and agreed treaties, often ignoring the reservations and opt-outs that states include before signing. See Kelly, supra note 79 (citing Louis B. Sohn, supra note 48).
87.
Kelly, supra note 79, at 484.
[Vol. 29:1 books and casebooks, and the authors of articles in leading international law journals. "' n The new CIL differs from the traditional CIL paradigm in ways that question the wisdom of federal incorporation of CIL. First, the new CIL is both methodologically indeterminate and develops rapidly. Although traditional CIL relied on the subjective legal fiction of state practice, its norms generally reflected the state practices of great powers. Second, the new CIL is, paradoxically, also more elite-driven. It is not "elite-driven" by the few great powers that influenced the traditional CIL framework; rather, it is elite-driven by international legal scholars, epistemic communities, transgovernmental advocacy networks, and human rights advocates. By avoiding a connection with state practice, focusing on elite preferences, and using the ATS as a vehicle to disseminate CIL human rights norms, the sovereignty costs on receptive States increasesparticularly in democracies-as the imposition of these norms appears divorced from democratic processes. Although some may find this change normatively attractive, as a purely descriptive matter the new CIL is may become less reflective of state interests.
c. The United States and the New CIL
This critique of the new GIL's methodology and content does not constitute a rejection of the content of international human rights law. The improvement of human rights practices in the United States and the international community is an important goal. However, in light of the sovereignty costs for the United States, the critique simply questions the logic of federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation as the mechanisms to achieve them.
The United States' material power and dominance of international politics gives it the capacity to influence the development of CIL under the "traditional" paradigm. However, the new CIL's rejection of custom and state practice suggests that the new CIL is less likely to represent U.S. interests, challenging the desirability of federal incorporation of CIL. Though the United States has a role in the formation of CIL, the United States seems to recognize the costs of the new CIL phenomenon. The United States attaches reservations or modifications, or fails to ratify 89 many of the international conventions and treaties upon which some
88.
Sohn, supra note 83, at 399. CIL norms rely and ignores many social and cultural rights 9° listed in the Restatement. 9 '
[The United States] has proven to be a serious laggard in acceding to near universally-adopted international human rights conventions; where the United States has signed on to such accords, it has included conditions methodically limiting the scope of ratification to existing U.S. practice, rendering acceptance a largely hollow, falsely symbolic act. 92 Despite the attraction of these new rights, it is unclear that federal incorporation of the new CIL by the judiciary is preferable to their adoption through the political process, particularly if one assumes that there will be greater compliance with human rights norms if they are representative of the will of the people as opposed to imposed by an unelected judiciary.
The rapid development and breadth of the new CIL also militates against federal incorporation. The new CIL "now operates with respect to such matters as free speech and conscience; the practice of religion; health care; education, and shelter; social and cultural rights; criminal law, procedure, and the conditions of incarceration." 93 This is not the limit of new CIL norms: "The Restatement comments that there may be non-conventional human rights law in addition to that which it was prepared to recognize and restate at the time, and more such law would doubtless come." 94 While many may find these aspirational norms attractive, the new CIL's methodology reduces the United States' influence on its development and content, and increases the likelihood that the new CIL will conflict with American law and circumvents the American political process, suggesting that the United States and its citizens should be increasingly skeptical about the wisdom of federal incorporation of the new CIL.
90.
See Henkin, supra note 82, at 40 (noting that economic and social rights are on the same plane as civil and political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
91.
See Henkin, supra note 82, at 37-38. The new CIL "is being made, purposefully, knowingly, wilfully [sic], and concern for human rights has provided a principal impetus to its growth, and the law of human rights is a principal impetus to its growth ... " Id. at 37.
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Trends in International Politics
Recent trends 95 suggest that other powerful States will emerge over the medium-to-long term, influencing the content of the new CIL and perhaps moving it away from the traditional European and American foundations upon which it previously relied. Part of the attraction of international law in the United States grows from its tradition of representing the interests of the powerful States in the international system-States that, over at least the last three hundred years, have almost exclusively consisted of the United States and western European nations. However, the new CIL will not always embody the cultural, moral, normative, and strategic preferences of Western great powers and political elites. The new CIL's indeterminate methodology may actually serve to accelerate this change. It may not be in the United States' strategic or normative interests to incorporate the new CIL, a body of law that, over time, may not reflect American values.
Structural changes in the international system further challenge the wisdom of federal incorporation. 96 The collapse of the Soviet Union, the diminished threat of catastrophic nuclear war, and the decreased importance of U.S.-European solidarity suggest that the United States and European powers will increasingly differ on the content of the new CIL. The Soviet Union's implosion removed the existential threat that bound the United States and Europe during the Cold War, facilitated the creation of the European Union, and suppressed security competition on the
continent. Despite the continued presence of U.S. troops in Europe and the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States and the EU are developing different conceptions on the appropriate use of force in international politics, the salience of international institutions, the importance of multinational treaties and the role of international law. 98 China's "peaceful rise" is also relevant to understanding the future content of CIL. Some argue that China's rise does not threaten the United States and could result in peaceful relations based on shared economic benefits from trade liberalization and globalization. 99 China's need to maintain economic growth to ensure domestic stability, recent willingness to operate within international institutions, 95 .
See and decision to temper anti-United States rhetoric evidence a change in China's foreign policy goals and suggest that China's rise will be generally non-threatening and consistent with the current international order.,i°O thers suggest that while China's rise may be peaceful over the short term, Chinese economic growth, military development, and strategic interests will represent a challenge to U.S. interests and regional dominance in East Asia. 0 ' China has no incentive to challenge the United States over the short term, while its stellar economic growth continues and domestic issues-income inequality, environmental degradation, and rural underdevelopment-require more immediate attention. However, at current growth rates, China will have the world's largest economy by 2050, giving it the economic and military capacity to challenge the United States in East Asia over their fundamentally opposed strategic interests: China wants to limit the United States' influence and develop as the dominant power in the region, while the United States wants to prevent Chinese hegemony in East Asia. °2 As Chinese power grows, "the US needs to be prepared to renegotiate a host of important multilateral treaties that a powerful China will not be willing to obey-including, perhaps, human rights treaties"' 3 or, as I argue, the content of the new CIL.
Complementarity with American Foreign Policy
The wisdom of international human rights litigation in U.S. courts also depends on its relationship with American foreign policy. If the United States always prioritizes human rights and respect for international law as primary objectives-the universalist theory-international human rights litigation is consistent with and complementary to American foreign policy. However, if the United States pursues its foreign policy goals in an international system sensitive to power and driven by national self-interest, international human rights litigation may complicate the achievement of both normative and strategic foreign policy objectives.
100.
a. Potential for Conflict
The strategic interests of the United States and the normative interests of human rights advocates will not always converge. When they converge, the pursuit of normative goals through international human rights litigation complements the pursuit of strategic interests. For example, the United States' attempts to contain the Soviet Union through the development of military and economic resources (security interests) and its opposition to the lack of democracy and basic human rights under communism (normative interests) satisfied both goals. In other cases, however, the normative preferences of the litigants and their advocates, while laudable, may conflict with the United States' strategic interests and the foreign policy necessary to achieve them.
For example, it is highly questionable that international human rights litigation or the promotion of democracy in Jordan, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia will result in regimes that will embrace normative human rights practices. In fact, it may actually worsen the situation and will likely produce anti-U.S. regimes-Hamas's victory in the Palestinian elections, for examplethat challenge both the United States' strategic and normative interests. The key is to recognize that there are costs to binding the United States to a normative position when, at times, national security or strategic interests may require expediency.
Consider the complicated situation in Pakistan. The military government of Pervez Musharraf was, for the most part, an ally of the United States during the War on Terror. ' At the same time, Pakistan engaged in a number of practices that violate human rights law. Human Rights Watch notes: President Pervez Musharraf's military-backed government did little in 2006 to address a rapidly deteriorating human rights situation. Ongoing concerns include arbitrary detention, lack of due process, and the mistreatment, torture, and "disappearance" of terrorism suspects and political opponents; harassment and intimidation of the media; and legal discrimination against and practices against the costs of failing to achieve national security and strategic interests in determining the appropriate policies toward Pakistan.
First, Pakistan assists the United States in achieving national security goals: the elimination of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and the destruction of Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups. Second, Pakistan is a nuclear power with a divided security apparatus and unclear command and control procedures over its nuclear arsenal. Destabilizing the regime may threaten to jeopardize control of Pakistani nuclear weapons and materiel. Third, and most important, the United States wants stability in Pakistan. For many American policymakers, a democracy led by the late Benazhir Bhutto would have been preferable; however, a pro-U.S. government is the priority. To the extent that strategic interests reinforce normative and strategic goals, policy decisions are easier. But, given the complex political situation within Pakistan, the results of recent elections, and the United States' strategic interests, it is still unclear if regime change will produce a government that will support the United States' strategic interests and embrace its normative human rights concerns.06
The same difficult balance applies to other countries. For example, the United States' interest in promoting democracy and human rights in Egypt, Saudi Arabia,°7 or the Central Asian Republics, among many others, has been subordinated to the United States' strategic interest in maintaining pro-U.S. regimes in these States. ing chaos in Iraq, rising Iranian influence and the destabilizing IsraeliPalestinian conflict.., stability, not democracy, was its priority."' ' Some may respond that the very goal of international human rights litigation is to restrain the United States, modify American foreign policy, and encourage compliance with international human rights law. During the twentieth century, the United States adopted polices that supported autocratic dictators around the world and ignored clear human rights violations by allies. During the Cold War, the United States allied with anti-Soviet right-wing dictatorships regardless of their human rights abuses, respect for international law, or commitment to democracy. American "policymakers adopted a pragmatic rationale for defending dictatorships they favored, and moral judgments were invoked only when the [United States] opposed a regime rather than to provide a consistent principle to guide policy and base decisions.""° The United States provided economic and military aid to right-wing dictators in Chile,"' Greece,"' Indonesia,"' the Philippines," 4 the Congo,"' Nicaragua, 6 and Iran." 7 The United States was also apprehensive about twentieth century pro-democracy, pro-human rights, and national liberation movements in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. 
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Nicaragua, through the Somoza dictatorship, "need[s] a firm hand to maintain order, prevent communism, and protect American investments and trade in their nation." Id. at 182.
117. "It was widely known that the Iranian secret police, SAVAK, which had been created and trained by the CIA, routinely used torture on political opponents, spied on and harassed Iranian dissidents who lived overseas, and arrested people who were held in jail without charges or trial." Id. at 172.
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Id. at 3.
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litigation in U.S. courts will draw attention to these policies and force the United States, particularly the executive branch, to adopt a more human rights friendly foreign policy. Since victims of human rights abuses often have little legal recourse in their home countries, international human rights litigation provides an opportunity for foreign nationals to vindicate their rights. This position is normatively attractive. It could be argued that some of the United States' polices did not further the United States' normative or strategic interests and, in some cases, were counterproductive. My aim is not to defend American foreign policy. Rather, I argue that given the practical realities of international politics, the international system does not always operate in a manner that reflects the universalist theory of international law or the IR theories that underlie it. The United States simply cannot always privilege international human rights concerns over more immediate national security or strategic interests. International human rights litigation can both complicate the achievement of national security goals and the improvement of human rights practices. It creates a cost that, in some cases, outweighs the potential benefits of the litigation.
b. Costs of International Human Rights Litigation
Some may challenge the contention that international human rights litigation creates costs for American foreign policy. In some cases, the United States, through the executive branch, has taken the position that international human rights litigation under the ATS does not conflict with American foreign policy goals." 9 Stephens, supra note 119, at 185.
123.
Id. at 177-78.
[Vol. 29:1 facilitated the achievement of the United States' strategic and normative interests. However, the executive branch's support of international human rights litigation in specific cases does not suggest that all such litigation complements American foreign policy; rather, it suggests that the executive determined that, in some cases, the litigation complements the United States' normative and strategic interests. It is unsurprising that the executive branch did not object to international human rights litigation during the 1990s, the beginning of U.S. unipolar dominance of international politics. The Soviet Union had disappeared, its satellite States in Eastern Europe had moved toward democracy, and China was in the early stages of its economic growth. The threat of terrorism and nuclear proliferation were important but not primary foreign policy concerns. During this period, the cases that survived motions to dismiss "almost exclusively involved abuses committed under regimes that were defunct and repudiated by their successors, nearly universally shunned by other governments, possessed of, at best, uncertain claims to statehood or legitimate state power, lacking in geopolitical significance, politically unimportant to Washington, or clearly condemned by the United States."' 24 In other words, the executive branch's support of international human rights litigation appeared to coincide with an assessment that the litigation against insignificant, pariah States would generate minimal costs for American foreign policy and might have some positive effect on human rights practices.
This will not always be the case. The filing of international human rights litigation directly implicates the executive branch's foreign affairs prerogatives. First, the majority of ATS cases are dismissed on various procedural grounds.' 2 5 Despite this fact, the mere filing of litigation engages American foreign policy without producing any tangible benefit for the victims of human rights abuses. Second, even if international human rights litigation were more successful, there is little evidence that such litigation, by itself, results in an improvement of human rights practices in the targeted States.1 6 In fact, as I argue below, it may even produce a backlash against the United States and the human rights norms that the litigation promotes. Finally, the threat of international human rights litigation against American and foreign corporations may also provide States that prioitize strategic interests-and do not try to impose human rights norms and values on other States-with opportunities to challenge U.S. strategic interests. For example, China builds relationships with States to achieve its strategic interests regardless of their human rights record. China has signed oil and natural gas deals with Iran, the Sudan, Angola, Chad, Venezuela, and other States. China hosted a "China-Africa Summit" in late 2006 to build relationships with African leaders with the goal of gaining access to natural resources. "China is picking up natural resources----oil, precious minerals-to feed its expanding economy and new markets for its burgeoning enterprises. The African countries get investment and both parties are building political alliances in a world they often see as overly dominated by the United States and other Western powers.
Although human rights groups have heavily criticized China for its human rights violations and support of autocratic regimes, "Chinese officials, however, insist that their country's involvement has improved the lives of ordinary Africans without meddling in political affairs-strict adherence to China's diplomatic policy of noninterference."' 2 8 Since States value sovereignty and the autonomy of their political order, they may consider international human rights litigation in U.S. courts to be an unreasonable interference into their domestic affairs, nudging them toward the United States' strategic competitors for economic, political, and military support.
The promotion of human rights, democracy, and basic civil liberties is an integral part of American foreign policy. However, the legal mechanisms to help achieve these goals should complement, not complicate, the realization of both American national security and normative interests. The current legal regime gives decisionmaking authority on the consequences of international human rights litigation for the United States to the branch with a minimal foreign affairs prerogative and institutional competency vis-A-vis the executive and legislative branches. 128. Id.
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Over the long run, it is unwise to have international human rights litigation in U.S. courts commit the executive branch to a specific normative vision of international politics when the executive branch has to pursue U.S. national interests in a world sensitive to power. The international system does not always operate according to the predictions of social constructivism, democratic peace theory, and institutionalism. Without some level of deference to the executive, international human rights litigation might limit the United States' flexibility and increase the cost of achieving normative and strategic interests.
IV. NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
Part of the logic of international human rights litigation relies on the capacity of shared norms and social practices to encourage States and individuals to internalize normative human rights practices. The values embodied in international human rights law are universal and transcend state, national, and cultural divisions. All people want to live free from genocide and torture. International human rights litigation helps disseminate and internalize universal, aspirational human rights norms.
While no reasonable person can quarrel with the normative desire to rid the world of human rights violations, attempts to extraterritorially impose universal values on weaker States with different cultural traditions may generate a backlash. Some States might view human rights litigation in U.S. courts as yet another attempt by the United States to impose its values on the international community. International human rights litigation does not occur in a vacuum, divorced from the past widespread and repeated use of international law to legitimate European and American colonialism and imperialism, and violate the sovereignty of weak States in Latin America, Africa and Asia. For centuries, western great powers used international law to distinguish between "Christian and barbaric" States and "civilized and uncivilized" nations to justify the territorial occupation and colonial subjugation of many of the world's non-European people. 9 International law was used as a tool to legitimate violations of sovereignty-colonialism-and protect the military and economic interests of powerful States. During the nineteenth century, "when sovereignty was generally accepted as fixed, stable and monolithic [for Western European nations], colonial jurists self-consciously grasped the usefulness of keeping sovereignty undefined in order that it be extended or withdrawn according to the requirements of [European] interests." 30 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, "the nations of Europe competed in the largest land grab in history (Africa) during the same period that the United States was attempting to impose an international minimum standard of compensation for expropriation on Latin America."'' Since international law represented the interests of colonial powers, more often than not international law has been the enemy of weaker, non-Westem States. For many of the targets of international human rights litigation, the United States' attempts to impose "universal" values through litigation could be viewed as the evolution of nineteenth century territorial imperialism to a twenty-first century moral imperialism. Given this history, international human rights litigation may generate a backlash and encourage the rejection of the very values that the litigation promotes.
A. Nationalism
Nationalism is a highly contested term with no agreed definition or shared conception of its development. For primordialists, nationalism is tied to primordial ethnies or historical communities of people with common identities, ideologies, and sentiments.' 32 For constructivists, it is the belief in an imagined political community, produced through the confluence of specific cultural and historical forces in eighteenth century Europe and replicated throughout the world.' 33 Others focus on the nation and nationalism as a social discourse, constantly being framed and reframed through shared social practices, common histories, and myth-making."' Still others argue that nationalism is no longer relevant in the modem world.' Regardless of its source, nationalism appears to create a strong feeling of affective belonging that results in an intense loyalty to the nation and State.
The creation and development of colonial nationalisms is most relevant for understanding the connection between international human rights litigation and the possible arousal of nationalistic sentiment. In the colonial world, nationalist leaders had to develop narratives, histories, and common resistance while subordinate to a colonial power.' 36 The governmental institutions and administrative policies of the colonial powers clearly differentiated between the native and the foreign sovereign, creating the intellectual space to develop a nationalist consciousness. Arab, Turkish, Chinese, and Indian nationalisms, along with the various nationalisms that resulted in African independence movements and contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Empire, were born under colonial subjugation.' 37 The intensity of these nationalisms is constantly reinforced by the contemporary European and American domination of the international system, the perceived promotion of Western values as "universal," and the perceived denigration of non-Western societies. It is not a specious argument about the existence of authoritarian "Asian" values or intolerant "Islamic" fundamentalism; rather, some regimes win favor with their citizens and legitimate their rule by tapping into a nationalist discourse of resistance against the former colonial occupiers. States may manipulate the mere existence of international human rights litigation to strengthen their political position. Unfortunately, this may result in citizens rejecting the substance of normative human rights practices because of the form of their introduction-litigation in the distant court of a selfinterested foreign power perceived to be imposing its values on the international community.
B. Nationalism and China
China provides an excellent example of the potential of international human rights litigation to generate strong nationalistic fervor and affect Sino-American relations. With the demise of Maoist communism as a governing ideology, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has turned to nationalism to legitimate its rule.' Through a combination of
136.
See PARTHA CHATTERJEE, NATIONALIST THOUGHT AND THE COLONIAL WORLD: A DERIVATIVE DISCOURSE (1986).
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See For an examination of Chinese responses to international human rights litigation, see deLisle, supra note 124. Jacque deLisle recognizes the strong reaction of the Chinese government to U.S. interference in its domestic affairs through international human rights litigation, but suggests that the Chinese understand that judicial opinions are not equivalent to executive determinations of policy. Assuming, arguendo, that this is accurate, it does not vitiate the argument that the Chinese government can manipulate the litigation internally to encourage anti-U.S. sentiment and diminish the litigation's efficacy in diffusing human rights norms.
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V. OBJECTIONS AND COUNTERARGUMENTS
The principal objections to this Article will likely focus on my description of international politics and the possibility of international human rights litigation complicating American foreign policy. Though they are related objections, the former relates to IR theory and the latter concerns the extant legal regime for international human rights litigation. This section addresses these and other counterarguments.
A. Conception of International Politics
Wrong IR Theory?
I do not argue that a particular conception of IR is always correct; rather, I suggest that social constructivism, democratic peace theory, and institutionalism do not explain all state behavior. Using a framework more sensitive to the role of power and national self-interest in international politics, I conclude that federal incorporation of CIL generates sovereignty costs and international human rights litigation complicates American foreign policy. However, this conclusion relies on the view that there is some role for power and self-interest in explaining state behavior in international politics. If power and self-interest have little explanatory value, my concern about federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation may be misplaced.
Some may argue that the changes in the structure of the international system, the rise of democratic governments, and the growing discourse about shared norms, human rights, and the rule of law demonstrate that power and self-interest no longer explain state behavior in international politics. Economic interdependence,'" globalization, and the specter of nuclear annihilation make a great power war both extremely expensive and potentially catastrophic. Human trafficking, environmental degradation, the rise of non-state actors, nuclear proliferation, economic integration-issues relevant in the post-Cold War world-all require coordinated, multinational efforts to resolve. The World Trade Organization, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations-along with other public and private actors-intrude on
144.
But see E.H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS 1919-1939 (1939) ; MEARSHEIMER, supra note 50, at 371; WALTZ, supra note 50 (arguing that economic interdependence by itself has not prevented security competition or military conflict between states with shared economic interests but conflicting security concerns).
Fall 20071 state sovereignty and play an increasingly prominent role in international politics. These developments portend an era of multilateralism, institutions, and international law to resolve the international community's most pressing issues. Consequently, we see the establishment of more than fifty international judicial bodies, the majority of which emerged over the past 30 years, 45 and the judicialization of international institutions through arbitration and international dispute resolution mechanisms.", The main problem with this argument is that these developments are still consistent with a vision of international politics that allows a role for power and self-interest. Powerful States often create international institutions to reflect the underlying distribution of power in international politics and lower the cost of managing international order. Institutions operate in the interests of their creators and, if they fail to do so, the institutions are sometimes ignored. In the security context, the United States' decisions to ignore or circumvent the United Nations Security Council in Kosovo (President Clinton) and more recently in Iraq (President George W. Bush) are consistent with self-interested state behavior. Similarly, multilateral efforts to address environmental pollution and terrorism also reflect national self-interest.
The United States engages international law in a similar manner. The United States routinely withdraws from multilateral treaties or attaches reservations to prevent their application within the American legal system.' 7 Despite the proliferation of international judicial bodies, the United States also circumvents the power of international courts by refusing to join-the International Criminal Court, 14 8 for example--or by signing bilateral agreements with States to exempt American citizens from their respective jurisdictions. These policies reflect the United States' power advantage in international politics and national selfinterest in compliance with international law. The new challenges that States face in the post-Cold War world and the mechanisms that powerful States use to manage international order do not reflect a fundamental change in international politics; power considerations and national selfinterest still have a role to play.
The Universalist Theory Reflected in American Foreign Policy?
Some may argue that the United States has always prioritized democracy, human rights, and rule of law as the most important elements of American foreign policy. The United States was the driving force behind the creation of international institutions to manage world affairs and encourage multilateralism: the League of Nations, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. As the leader of the free world, the United States confronted the Soviet Union, assisted the former Warsaw Pact countries in their transitions to democracy, and encouraged democratic governance in Latin America. Through the State Department, the United States regularly criticizes states for failing to improve poor human rights practices or ensure basic civil liberties for their citizens. More than any other country, the United States works to spread democracy, normative human rights practices, and respect for the rule of law. American foreign policy, at its core, reflects the universalist theory and the IR theories that underlie it. Federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation are consistent with this vision.
Despite this evidence, the universalist theory fails to show a connection between its foundational IR assumptions about international politics and the prioritization of security and strategic interests present in American foreign policy. For at least the majority of the twentieth century,1 dominant theory in the American foreign policy establishment 52 during the Cold War.' 53 From 1945 to 1989, the United States operated in a manner generally consistent with realism, focusing on the development of American economic and military strength (material power to achieve security) and support of anticommunist regimes to balance and contain the Soviet Union in a bipolar international system.
American foreign policy has reflected the difficult tension between competing normative and strategic goals. In a number of circumstances, Republican and Democratic administrations have made the difficult decision to prioritize the United States' security interests over promoting human rights. Although in a perfect world the pursuit of normative interests would always be preferable, the United States sometimes has immediate security and strategic concerns that require difficult compromises. The absence of a central enforcement mechanism forces States to ensure their security before pursuing normative goals. This painful compromise is likely to continue.
One might respond that the post-Cold War era is an opportunity for the United States to turn away from its history of self-interested power politics. Social constructivism,1 4 institutionalism,' 55 and democratic peace theory 5 6 began to challenge realism's dominance in IR theory and in the foreign policy establishment after the end of the Cold War. American foreign policy seemed to focus on human rights and the rule of law as primary concerns. As President Clinton stated:
We can then say to the people of the world, whether you live in Africa, or Central Europe, or any other place, if somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it is within our power to stop it, we will stop it.' 57 However, American foreign policy did not conform completely with its rhetoric. While the U.S. military acted in Somalia and Haiti, humanitarian interventions that "reflected no traditional notion of American national interest in the sense that their outcome could in no way affect any historic definition of American security,"' ' 8 the United States also ignored the Russian crackdown in Chechnya, the atrocities in Rwanda," Sierra Leone, the Sudan, and the Caucasus-all conflicts that generated large numbers of civilian deaths and casualties and gross human rights violations. This tension in American foreign policy begs the question:
If the Clinton Doctrine required aiding the victims of brutality in Kosovo, why did it not in Rwanda, Chechnya, Tibet, Iraq, the Sudan or Sierre Leone? The application of universal principles on so selective a basis could help but raise questions about what the standards for selection were to be and whether expediency as much as morality determined them.' 6 0 Again, this is a description rather than an indictment or a defense of the United States or its foreign policy. In an international system without a central enforcement mechanism that is sensitive to the role of power, the United States has made the difficult decision of privileging strategic interests over human rights concerns to achieve national interests.
Finally, after the terrible events of September 11, 2001, the United States has allied itself with dictatorships that share the United States' strategic interests-in this case, a common opposition to Al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups-but reject democracy and engage in human [returned] and, as a consequence, the demands of stability appeared, once again, to have trumped those of equity." ' The U.S. occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, the broader War on Terror, the likelihood of a continued U.S. presence in the Middle East, the increasing prominence of non-state actors, the United States' security commitments in East Asia, the long-term prospect of new rising powers in the international system (China), and the exigencies of international politics suggest that the United States will be forced, at times, to privilege strategic interests over human rights concerns. My framework incorporates these considerations in providing a more nuanced evaluation of federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation. In contrast, the universalist theory relies on an aspirational conception of international politics.
B. International Human Rights Litigation and Foreign Policy
Perhaps concerns about federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation are overblown. It could be that federal judges are capable of making similar determinations about the consequences of international human rights litigation in U.S. courts. They have dismissed claims that were not based on specific, binding, or obligatory CIL norms and have only allowed claims for gross violation of human rights to proceed.' 62 Judicial procedural safeguards, including forum non conveniens 6 3 and foreign sovereign immunity,' 64 protect potential defendants.' 6 5 Moreover, the executive branch can intervene if litigation threatens or compromises the United States' security or strategic interests. Thus, it could be argued that the current regime is sufficient.
Is the Existing Regime Sufficient?
Given the new CIL's unclear methodology and content, it is difficult to limit' 6 the types of cases and the opportunities for disruption that international human rights litigation may produce. Despite Sosa and its specific, universal, and obligatory standard, the next wave of interna-
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See Stephens, supra note 119. tional human rights litigation under the ATS will likely focus on corporate activities and, according to some, challenge executive branch foreign policy decisions.' 6 This could severely complicate the pursuit of the national interest, particularly when the United States makes the difficult decision to subordinate its normative goals to achieve more immediate national security or strategic interests. As others have noted,'6' the federal judiciary is not best suited to determine amorphous, indeterminate new CIL norms on a case-by-case basis.' 69 First, the new CIL's methodological incoherence and rapidly changing content are so contested that seasoned scholars of international law strongly disagree about how to identify or even determine the existence of many purportedly universal new CIL norms.' 70 Second, federal judges "have, at most, a superficial familiarity with the theory of law creation in the international legal system and only the vaguest notion of how the system functions."'' Third, federal judges also lack appropriate guidance as "neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make reference to methods or requirements for pleading or proving customary international law in United States courts.' 72 This is not a criticism of the capacity of U.S. federal judges; rather, it is a description of the new CIL's unclear methodology and the difficulties that federal judges face in adjudicating international human rights claims.
Litigation Encourages Positive Human Rights Practices?
Advocates of international human rights litigation concede that the enforcement of successful judgments under the ATS is difficult. However, international human rights litigation brings attention to violations of human rights law, provides victims with an opportunity to vindicate their rights in court, and encourages the creation of institutions to prevent future human rights violations. International human rights litigation encourages the adoption of normative human rights practices.
Though empirical work on the effects of human rights treaties on state behavior exists,' there is little evidence of a specific causal relationship between international human rights litigation in U.S. courts and changes in the domestic legal regimes or the behavior of targeted States. International human rights litigation is unlikely to have more than a negligible effect, by itself, on actual state practices and may stunt the adoption of the normative practices that it promotes.
If successful, international human rights litigation provides judgments that are rarely enforced. While the opportunity to be heard may have a healing value for the plaintiffs, a decision by a U.S. court, far removed from the country in which the human rights violations occurred and the perpetrators reside, is only symbolic. Given the limited capacity of international human rights litigation to affect state practice, such hollow victories may actually expose some of the weaknesses of international law and an international judicial system without a central enforcement mechanism.
It is also unclear whether the citizens of target States have any independent knowledge of the litigation. Even if we assume that they do, it is unlikely that these unenforced, symbolic victories in U.S. courts penetrate deeply into the target States' populations, weakening social constructivist arguments that international human rights litigation, by itself, can socialize States, acculturate individuals, and encourage shared norms and practices.
Finally, international human rights litigation in U.S. courts may actually delay the acceptance of preferred human rights practices. As noted earlier, such litigation can be manipulated to generate a nationalistic response-framing it as yet another attempt by the United States to impose its "universal" values on the international community. Whatever their failings, the United Nations, human rights groups, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations have more legitimacy in the international community to encourage respect for human rights than a U.S. federal district court. Many have a presence within the borders of States where violations are likely to occur and have much better access to the populace. Since they do not necessarily appear as appendages of the United States, such groups are also less likely to generate a nationalistic backlash. International human rights litigation may very well complicate the efforts of the organizations best-placed to achieve concrete human rights improvements.
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Not Just Doctrine CONCLUSION Federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation relies on a universalist theory of international law. The universalist theory is rooted in specific IR theories and drives a project to incorporate international law into the American legal system, develop a global legal architecture, and use U.S. courts to encourage progressive change. Federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation are incremental steps toward that goal.
However, a broader consideration of IR and a competing theory of state compliance based on power and self-interest generates a framework that demonstrates that federal incorporation of CIL also creates sovereignty costs, and that international human rights litigation will complicate the realization of the United States' normative and strategic interests. The argument is not a rejection of universal human rights and the rule of law. It simply suggests that the universalist legal theory is driven by IR theories that minimize the role of power and national selfinterest in international politics.
Beyond the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa, addressing these concerns may require congressional action to define the international law norms actionable under the ATS and provide guidance on the delicate balance between the pursuit of U.S. interests in a world sensitive to power and the concurrent commitment of the United States to international human rights litigation. One example of such action within foreign relations law is the shift from the Tate Letter regime on governing the executive's case-by-case determinations of sovereign immunity to the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which codified the sovereign immunity standard for the judiciary. 7 4 Another is the Torture Victim Protection Act, which specifies the procedural and substantive rules for bringing torture claims under international law in U.S. federal courts.' 75 However, in the absence of contemporary congressional action to address the concerns outlined here for international human rights litigation under the ATS, this Article implicitly endorses an incremental expansion of executive branch decision-making authority vis-A-vis the judiciary for international human rights litigation. For various reasons, the executive is institutionally best-suited to determine the United States' strategic and normative interests; develop the appropriate foreign policy to achieve those goals; and evaluate wisdom of federal incorporation of CIL and international human rights litigation under the ATS. The executive branch can best determine whether federal incorporation of CIL generates high sovereignty costs for the United States. It also has the institutional competence, prerogatives, and resources to determine whether international human rights litigation will negatively affect the executive branch in its pursuit of strategic interests, calibrate the United States' position on specific international human rights litigation with ongoing diplomatic overtures, and coordinate the collection and analysis of information to determine the best course of action. Finally, the executive, unlike the judiciary, is directly politically accountable. These factors suggest that a slight movement along the continuum of existing judicial deference toward the executive branchperhaps in the form of judicial review of executive determinations on specific litigation under an arbitrary and capricious, abuse of discretion, or reasonableness standard-is warranted for international human rights litigation under the ATS.
